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ABSTRACT
Historically, commodity futures have had excess returns similar to those of equities. But what should
we expect in the future? The usual risk factors are unable to explain the time-series variation in
excess returns. In addition, our evidence suggests that commodity futures are an inconsistent, if not
tenuous, hedge against unexpected inflation. Further, the historically high average returns to a
commodity futures portfolio are largely driven by the choice of weighting schemes. Indeed, an
equally weighted long-only portfolio of commodity futures returns has approximately a zero excess
return over the past 25 years. Our portfolio analysis suggests that the a long-only strategic allocation
to commodities as a general asset class is a bet on the future term structure of commodity prices, in
general, and on specific portfolio weighting schemes, in particular. In contrast, we provide evidence
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structure of futures prices. We find that the tactical strategies provide higher average returns and
lower risk than a long-only commodity futures exposure.
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Historically, investing in commodity futures appears to have been as rewarding as investing 
in equities. Figure 1 shows that, since 1969, the 12.2% compound annualized return of the 
Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (GSCI) compares favorably with an 11.2% return for the 
Standard and Poor’s 500. In fact, the compound return on a rebalanced portfolio of 50% stocks 
and 50% commodity futures has historically outperformed both stocks and commodity futures 
with a significantly lower standard deviation of return.
i However, it is often dangerous to 
extrapolate past performance into the future.
ii Arnott and Bernstein (2002) point out that the past 
high excess returns for U.S. equities do not make the case that the forward looking equity risk 
premium is high.
iii Dimson, Marsh and Staunton (2004) present a similar case for global equities, 
and challenge the value of conclusions based on the performance of any single country. If history 
is an incomplete guide to investment prospects, what is the benefit to investing in commodity 
futures? To answer this question, it is necessary to create a framework for thinking about the 
prospective return from a commodity futures investment and analyze the role that commodity 
futures play in strategic and tactical asset allocation.  
Figure 1
Return and Risk
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Compound Return Standard Deviation T-Stat*
U.S. Inflation 4.79% 1.15%
Three Month Treasury Bill 6.33% 0.83%
Intermediate Government Bon 8.55% 5.82% 2.23
S&P 500 11.20% 15.64% 1.83
GSCI Total Return 12.24% 18.35% 1.89
50% S&P 500/50% GSCI 12.54% 11.86% 3.07
*Test of whether excess return is different from zero
Note: GSCI inception date is December 1969. During this time period, the S&P 500 and the GSCI had a monthly return correlation of -0.03.
50% S&P 500
50% GSCI
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2. Commodity indices and constituents  
2.1 Three benchmark commodity indices 
The usual way to compare the performance of commodity futures to other assets is to examine the 
performance of a fully collateralized, unlevered, diversified commodity futures index. A 
collateralized index provides the return of a passive long-only investment in commodity futures 
contracts such as wheat, gold, oil and copper. In making a fully collateralized commodity futures 
investment, an investor desiring $1 of commodity futures exposure would typically go long a 
commodity futures contract and invest $1 of “collateral” in a “safe” asset such as a Treasury bill. 
The three most commonly used commodity futures indices are the Goldman Sachs 
Commodity Index (GSCI)
iv, the Dow Jones-AIG Commodity Index (DJ AIG)
v, and the Reuters-
CRB Futures Price Index (CRB).
vi Figure 2 shows that the GSCI represents 86% of the combined 
open interest of the three indices, with the DJ AIG accounting for 10% of open interest and the 
CRB making up the remaining 4% of open interest. 
Figure 2
Market Value of Long Open Interest 
As May, 2004








Figure 3 shows that the three commodity indices have experienced different levels of return 
and volatility. The GSCI has twice the volatility of the CRB commodity index during the 
common time period for all three indices.
vii The DJ AIG Commodity Index and the GSCI have 
average returns similar to the Lehman Aggregate Bond Index and the CRB has a return similar to 
three-month Treasury bills, underperforming the Lehman Aggregate by 4% per annum. 
Surprisingly, the CRB index has a lower correlation with the GSCI (0.66 ) than the Wilshire 5000 
has with the Morgan Stanley Capital International EAFE index (0.70 ). The low correlation of 
U.S. equity returns and non-U.S. equity returns can be explained by the generally nonoverlapping 
composition of these equity portfolios. But this is not the case for commodity futures. 
Figure 3
Return And Risk
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Return Risk 1 2 3 4 5 6
1. GSCI 6.81% 17.53% 1.00
2. AIG 7.83% 11.71% 0.89 1.00
3. CRB 3.64% 8.30% 0.66 0.83 1.00
4. Wilshire 5000 11.60% 14.77% 0.06 0.13 0.18 1.00
5. EAFE 5.68% 15.53% 0.14 0.22 0.27 0.70 1.00
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2.2 Benchmark constituents and weighting 
The relatively low correlation can be explained by the different weighting of individual 
commodity futures contracts in each of the indices. As Table 1 shows, the GSCI currently invests 
in 24 underlying futures contracts, the DJ AIG index invests in 20 and the CRB index invests in 
17 different futures contracts. The GSCI is heavily skewed towards energy exposure because its 
portfolio weighting scheme is based on the level of worldwide production for each commodity.
viii 
The DJ AIG Commodity Index focuses primarily on futures contract liquidity data, supplemented 
with production data, as well as limits on maximum exposures to determine portfolio weights.
ix 
The CRB index is an equally weighted index.
x 
   
Table 1
The Composition of Commodity Indices 
(as of May 2004)
P ortfolio Weights
Co mmodity CRB GS CI DJ AI G
Aluminum - 0.029 0.071
Co coa 0.059 0.003 0.020
Co ffee 0.059 0.006 0.028
Copper 0.059 0.023 0.067
Corn 0.059 0.031 0.051
Cotton 0.059 0.01 1 0.01 8
Crude Oil 0.059 0.284 0.1 67
Brent Cr ude Oil - 0.1 31 -
Feeder Catt l e - 0.008 -
Gas Oil - 0.045 -
Go ld 0.059 0.019 0.053
Heating Oil 0.059 0.081 0.047
Le a d - 0 .0 03 -
Hogs 0.059 0.021 0.051
Live  Ca ttle 0.059 0.036 0.067
Natural Gas 0.059 0.095 0.099
Nickel - 0.008 0.019
Orange Juice 0.059 - -
Platinum 0.059 0.000 -
Silver 0.059 0.002 0.022
So ybeans 0.059 0.019 0.051
Soybean Oil - 0.000 0.017
Sugar 0.059 0.014 0.038
U nleaded Gas - 0.085 0.054
Wheat 0.059 0.029 0.038
Red W heat - 0.01 3 0.000
Zinc - 0.005 0.023
To tal 1.000 1.000 1.000
Number o f Futures Contracts 17 24 20
Gini co efficient 0.00 0.65 0.32
Data Source:  Goldman Sachs, Dow Jones AIG  
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There is an important difference between the weighting schemes of commodity indices 
versus stock and bond indices. Most stock and bond market indices use market capitalization 
weights. While there may be a debate as to what measure of stock or bond market capitalization 
to use (total market capitalization or some float or liquidity adjusted measure), market 
capitalization weights are seemingly objective. However, there is no market capitalization for 
commodity futures. In fact, as Black (1976) pointed out, since there is always a short futures 
position for every long futures position, the market capitalization of commodity futures is always 
zero. The CRB index employs equal weights.  In contrast, the GSCI uses “production” weights. 
These weights are determined annually by calculating the annual production for each commodity, 
averaging the production values over five years and then weighting each commodity relative to 
the sum of all the production values. Portfolio weights for the DJ AIG index are rebalanced every 
year using a combination of production weights and liquidity considerations. Liquidity-based 
portfolio weights emphasize storable commodities, such as gold, and production based portfolio 
weights emphasize non-storable commodities, such as live cattle and oil. 
 
2.3 Interpreting the historical performance 
The differing approaches to weighting complicate the historical analysis. In addition, it is also the 
case that the performance histories of commodity futures indices are longer than the trading 
histories of the indices. However, in making strategic asset allocation decisions, many investors 
will use the complete history of returns – even if some of the history is backfilled. For these 
commodity indices with subjective choices of weights, one needs to exercise caution. For 
instance, the GSCI has been traded since 1992, yet its performance history was backfilled to 
1969. From 1969 to 1991, the GSCI had a compound annual return of 15.3%, beating the 11.6% 
return for the S&P 500. From 1991 to May 2004, the compound annualized return of the GSCI 
was 7.0% and the S&P 500 had a return of 10.4%. Is it possible that the GSCI weights were 
determined with an eye towards creating an index that outperformed stocks and to enhance the 
ability of Goldman Sachs to convince investors of the appeal of commodity futures investment? 
The historical performance of the DJ AIG index potentially suffers from similar construction bias 
since it has been traded since 1998 but its history goes back to 1991. From the inception of the 
performance history of the DJ AIG Commodity Index to its first trade date in July of 1998, the 
AIG index had a compound annualized return of 4.1% while the GSCI only had a return of 0.5%. 
Is it possible that the DJ AIG index was created with an emphasis on demonstrating hypothetical 
historical outperformance relative to the GSCI and to respond to some investors concerns about    7
the high energy weighting. The CRB index's performance history commences in 1982 and the 
futures contracts first started trading in 1986. For each of these indices, the returns since trading 
actually started are tangible while the pre-trading returns are to some degree hypothetical. 
Table 2 looks at the historical excess returns of the overall GSCI, five GSCI sectors, and 
twelve individual constituents of the GSCI. We begin the analysis in 1982 because (a) the GSCI 
is currently an energy oriented commodity index, (b) energy futures are a large part of all futures 
open interest, and (c) the first energy futures contract entered the GSCI in January of 1983.
xi  
Over this sample, the GSCI has a compound annualized excess return of 4.49%, higher than the 
3.45% excess return for the Lehman Aggregate bond index and lower than the 7.35% excess 
return for the S&P 500. The energy sector of the GSCI provides a return of 7.06% and the non-
energy sector had a return of -0.12%. Among the twelve individual commodities, heating oil has 
an annual return of 5.53% and silver has a return of -8.09%. An initially equally weighted buy-
and-hold portfolio experiences an average annual return of 0.70%, an equally weighted, monthly 
rebalanced, portfolio has an average annual return of  1.01% and the equally weighted average of 
the twelve individual commodity returns is -1.71%. The difference in return between the GSCI 
and these three averages reflects the significant energy exposure of the GSCI.  
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Table 2
Historical Excess Return













cor r el ati on
Difficult 
Storage
GSCI Index 4.49% 5.81 % 16.97% 1.22 0.51 1.98 0.26 0.11
Non-Energy -0.1 2% 0.36% 9.87% -0.06 0.09 -0.01 -0.01 0.01
Ene rg y 7.0 6% 11.52% 31.23 % 1.0 5 0 .73 2.2 8 0.23 0 .15
L ivestock 2.45% 3.48% 14.51% 0.78 -0.19 0.93 0.1 7 0.05
Agriculture -3.1 3% -2.15% 14.35% -1 .01 0.20 0.85 -0.22 -0.01
I ndustrial Metals 4.00% 6.41 % 22.82% 0.81 1.27 5.92 0.1 8 0.06
Precious Metals -5.42% -4.46% 1 4.88% -1.69 0.29 2.21 -0.36 -0.18
H eating Oi l 5.53% 1 0.51 % 32.55% 0.79 0.64 1.94 0.1 7 0.04 Yes
L ive Cattle 5.07% 5.94% 1 3.98% 1.68 -0.51 2.74 0.36 0.02 Yes
L ive Hogs -2.75% 0.1 7% 24.21% -0.53 -0.04 1.14 -0.11 -0.04 Yes
Wheat -5.39% -3.32% 21 .05% -1 .18 0.16 0.17 -0.26 -0.01 No
Corn -5.63% -3.32% 22.65% -1 .15 1.37 9.16 -0.25 0.00 No
Soybeans -0.35% 1 .92% 21 .49% -0.08 0.44 1.86 -0.02 0.01 No
Sugar -3.1 2% 3.69% 38.65% -0.37 1.60 7.03 -0.08 0.03 No
Coffee -6.36% 0.85% 39.69% -0.74 1.12 3.09 -0.1 6 0.01 No
Cotton 0.10% 2.60% 22.64% 0.02 0.61 1.37 0.00 0.05 No
Gold -5.68 % -4 .8 1% 14.36 % -1.8 3 0.3 0 2.3 3 -0.40 -0 .14 No
Silver -8.09% -5.30% 25.03% -1.49 0.46 2.05 -0.32 -0.15 No
Copper 6.17% 9.1 5% 25.69% 1.11 1.03 3.92 0.24 0.06 Yes
Twelve Commod ities
EW Buy-and-Hold 0.70% 1 .26% 10.61% 0.31 0.05 0.69 0.07 0.01
EW Rebalanced Portfolio 1.01 % 1.51% 10.05% 0.46 0.01 0.37 0.1 0 -0.04
Average of 12 Commodities -1 .71% 1.51% 8.17% -0.72 0.60 2.57 0.23 0.07
Rebalanci ng I mpact 2.72% 0.00% 1.88% 0.78 -0.60 -2.20 -0.1 3 -0.11
L ehman Aggregate 3.45% 3.50% 4.65% 3.43 -0.20 0.48 0.74 0.12
S& P 500 7.35% 8.30% 15.30% 2.22 -0.76 2.70 0.48 -0.01
MSCI  EAFE 5.84% 7.1 8% 17.29% 1.56 -0.22 0.38 0.34 0.05
 
2.4 The correlation of constituents 
Our initial analysis of the data raises an interesting point: the average commodity futures contract 
has a return that is close to zero (-1.71%) yet there is substantial dispersion of individual 
commodity futures returns about this average.  
Table 3 shows that the average level of commodity return correlations is low. Heating oil 
and silver excess returns are essentially uncorrelated (0.02). The average correlation of the twelve 
commodity futures returns with the GSCI is 0.13. The average correlation of individual 
commodities with one another is only 0.09. For instance, heating oil’s average correlation with 
the other eleven commodities is 0.03, its highest correlation of 0.15 is with gold and its lowest 
correlation of -0.07 is with coffee. The average correlation of the commodity sectors (energy, 
livestock, agriculture, industrial metals and precious metals) with the GSCI is 0.33. However, this 


























Livestock 0.20 0.63 0.01
Agriculture 0.24 0.78 0.01 0.12
Industrial Metals 0.13 0.31 0.03 -0.02 0.17
Preciou s Metals 0.19 0.20 0.14 0.03 0.08 0.20
Heating Oil 0.87 0.08 0.94 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.13
Cattle 0.12 0.50 -0.03 0.84 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.00
Hogs 0.21 0.52 0.06 0.81 0.13 -0.06 0.05 0.06 0.37
Wheat 0.25 0.66 0.06 0.18 0.79 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.12 0.17
Corn 0.14 0.58 -0.03 0.10 0.78 0.12 -0.01 -0.04 0.05 0.11 0.52
S oyb eans 0.20 0.58 0.02 0.11 0.72 0.18 0.14 0.05 0.03 0.14 0.43 0.70
S u g a r 0 . 0 30 . 2 1- 0 . 0 6- 0 . 0 50 . 3 5 0 . 1 4 0 . 0 5 - 0 . 0 4 0 . 0 2- 0 . 1 00 . 1 1 0 . 1 20 . 0 9
Coffee -0.01 0.15 -0.04 -0.07 0.23 0.07 0.01 -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 0.00 0.03 0.07 -0.01
Cotton 0.11 0.25 0.06 0.00 0.27 0.17 0.04 0.05 -0.06 0.06 0.05 0.11 0.18 -0.02 -0.01
G old 0.20 0.16 0.16 0.01 0.07 0.18 0.97 0.15 -0.02 0.04 0.07 -0.01 0.14 0.02 0.00 0.03
S ilver 0.08 0.19 0.02 0.02 0.10 0.19 0.77 0.02 -0.01 0.05 0.03 0.09 0.13 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.66
Copper 0.15 0.36 0.04 0.01 0.22 0.94 0.20 0.07 0.03 -0.02 0.08 0.16 0.23 0.14 0.11 0.19 0.18 0.21
Aver age Cor relations
GSCI with commodity sectors 0.33
GSCI with individual commodities 0.13
Heating oil with other commodities 0.03
Individual commodities  -0.09
 
3. Models of expected returns 
Most previous research has focused on the expected returns of a commodity index, without 
considering the expected returns for the portfolio constituents. We will consider both. 
 
3.1 Decomposition of the index return 
The total return on a diversified cash collateralized commodity futures portfolio can be 
decomposed into three components: 
Commodity Portfolio Total Return = Cash Return + Excess Return + Diversification Return   10
The excess return is simply the change in the price of a futures contract. If, for instance, an 
investor purchases a gold futures contract for $400 an ounce and later sells the contract for $404 
an ounce, the excess return on this position would be 1%. The diversification return is a 
synergistic “the whole is greater than the sum of the parts” benefit attributable to portfolio 
rebalancing. For a portfolio consisting of two or more assets, a diversification return simply 
means that the compound return of a fixed weight portfolio will be greater than the weighted 
average of the compound returns of the individual investments. The diversification return is due 
to the reduction in variance as investors form diversified portfolios.
xii  
Regardless of the model for expected excess returns of the components, Greer (2000) and de 
Chiara and Raab (2002) show that commodity futures indices might have expected returns similar 
to equities. The ongoing process of rebalancing investments in a commodity futures index can be 
a significant source of return.  We explore the diversification return in more detail in section 3.5. 
 
3.2 The CAPM perspective 
Lummer and Siegel (1993) and Kaplan and Lummer (1998) argue that the long-run expected 
return of an investment in the GSCI should be similar to that of Treasury bills.  For the cash 
collateralized GSCI, this is equivalent to saying that the expected excess return should be zero. 
Given that commodities tend to have low correlations with other commodities as well as with 
stocks and bonds, this view is consistent with analysis of Dusak (1973) who documents low betas 
and low expected returns in the context of the Capital Asset Pricing Model of Sharpe (1964) and 
Lintner (1965). 
There is considerable evidence that a multifactor model is needed to explain the cross-
section and time-series of asset returns. In section 3.5, we explore the role of unexpected inflation 
as well as a five factor model.  
 
3.3 The insurance perspective 
Gorton and Rouwenhorst  (2004) point out that Keynes’ (1930) theory of normal backwardation, 
in which hedgers use commodity futures to avoid commodity price risk, implies the existence of a 
commodity futures risk premium. If this risk premium is large enough, then returns could be 
similar to that of equities.    11
Keynes (1930) advanced the theory of normal backwardation in which he suggested that the 
futures price should be less than the expected future spot price. If today’s futures price is below 
the future spot price, then as the futures price converges towards the spot price at maturity, excess 
returns should be positive. Keynes' insight was that commodity futures allow operating 
companies to hedge their commodity price exposure, and since hedging is a form of insurance, 
hedgers must offer long-only commodity futures investors an insurance premium. Normal 
backwardation suggests that, in a world with risk-averse hedgers and investors, the excess return 
from a long commodity investment should be viewed as an insurance risk premium
xiii. Under 
normal backwardation investors who go long commodity futures should receive a positive risk 
premium, a positive excess return, and it is for this reason that normal backwardation provides a 
rationale that a long-only portfolio of commodity futures is an efficient way to allocate capital.  
Normal backwardation should also affect the cross-section of commodity futures excess 
returns. That is, a more normally backwardated commodity future should have a higher return 
than a less normally backwardated commodity future. However, since it is impossible to know 
what the expected future spot price is, normal backwardation is unobservable. Normal 
backwardation is primarily a belief that long-only investors in commodity futures should receive 
a positive excess rate of return. In spite of the ex ante nonobservability of normal backwardation, 
positive excess returns should be a good ex post indicator of the existence of normal 
backwardation. To test for a normal backwardation risk premium, Kolb (1992) looked at twenty-
nine different futures contracts and concluded that “normal backwardation is not normal”. 
Specifically, he noted that nine commodities exhibited statistically significant positive returns, 
four commodities had statistically significant negative returns and the remaining sixteen 
commodity returns were not statistically significant. Table 2 seems to support Kolb’s earlier 
finding. However, as Ibbotson and Kaplan (2000) show, a satisfactory understanding of asset 
returns requires an examination of the cross-section of returns, the time series of returns  and the 
level of returns. 
 
3.4 The cross-section of commodity returns 
3.4.1 Hedging pressure 
Is there an explanation for the lack of empirical support for the theory of normal backwardation?  
Cootner (1960) and  Deaves and Krinsky (1995) note that Keynes’ theory of normal 
backwardation assumes that hedgers have a long position in the underlying commodity and that   12
they seek to mitigate the impact of commodity price fluctuations by short selling commodity 
futures. As a result the futures price is expected to rise over time, providing an inducement for 
investors to go long commodity futures. They suggest that both backwardated commodities, 
where the spot price is greater than the futures price, and contango commodities, where the spot 
price is less than the futures price, might have risk premia if backwardation holds when hedgers 
are net short futures and contago holds when hedgers are net long futures. Bessembinder (1992) 
finds substantial evidence, over the time period 1967 to 1989, that average returns for sixteen 
nonfinancial futures are influenced by the degree of net hedging
xiv. In other words, commodities 
in which hedgers were net short had, on average, positive excess returns and commodities in 
which hedgers were net long had, on average, negative excess returns.  
De Roon, Nijman and Veld (2000) analyze twenty futures markets over the period 1986 to 
1994 and find that hedging pressure plays an important role in explaining futures returns. Anson 
(2002) distinguishes between markets that provide a hedge for producers (backwardated markets), 
and markets that provide a hedge for consumers (contango markets). He points out that a 
commodity producer such as Exxon, whose business requires it to be long oil, can reduce 
exposure to oil price fluctuations by being short crude oil futures. Hedging by risk averse 
producers causes futures prices to be below the expected spot rate in the future. Alternatively, a 
manufacturer such as Boeing is a consumer of aluminum, it is short aluminum, and it can reduce 
the impact of aluminum price fluctuations by purchasing aluminum futures. Hedging by risk 
averse consumers causes futures prices to be higher than the expected spot rate in the future. In 
this example , Exxon is willing to sell oil futures at an expected loss and Boeing is willing to 
purchase aluminum futures at an expected loss. Alternatively, investors receive a risk premium, a 
positive excess return, for going long backwardated commodity futures and for going short 
contangoed commodity futures. This suggests that a portfolio that goes long backwardated futures 
and short contangoed is an attractive way to allocate capital.  The losses incurred by the hedgers 
provide the economic incentive for the capital markets to provide price insurance to hedgers. 
Both of these examples highlight a view that commodity futures are a means of risk transfer and 
that the providers of risk capital charge an insurance premium. 
 
3.4.2 The term structure of futures prices and the ‘roll’ return 
The term structure of futures prices depicts the relationship between futures prices and the 
maturity of futures contracts. Figure 4 illustrates the term structure of futures prices for crude oil   13
and gold at the end of May 2004
xv. The futures price for crude oil declines as the time horizon 
increases, from a price of $40.95 per barrel of oil in for the July 2004 futures contract to a price of 
$36.65 for the June 2005 futures contract. This is an example of market backwardation
xvi, in 
which the futures price for a commodity is lower than the current spot price. Typically, the 
current spot price is the futures contract with the shortest time to maturity, the nearby futures 
contract. In this example, the futures price for gold increases as the time horizon increases. This 
relationship is known as contango. An upward or downward sloping term structure of futures 
prices creates the possibility of a futures price “roll return”
xvii. For instance, in this example, the 
futures price of oil in July 2005 was $36.65 and the July 2004 price was $40.95. If the term 
structure of oil remained unchanged, then the roll return from buying the July 2005 oil contract 
would be 13% ($40.95/$36.65 -1 = 13.1%). For gold, assuming no change in the term structure of 
gold futures prices, the roll return would have been -1.4% ($398.3/404-1 = -1.4%). Another way 
of looking at this is as follows: the term structure of commodity futures prices may provide 
hedgers with a convenient way to determine the expected price of commodity price insurance.     14
Figure 4




















































































Figure 5 shows that, since 1982, the excess return for heating oil futures was 5.5% per 
annum. The excess return consists of a spot return and a roll return. The spot return is the change 
in the price of the nearby futures contract. Since futures contracts have an expiration date 
investors who want to maintain a commodity futures position have to periodically sell an expiring 
futures contract and buy the next to expire contract. This is called rolling a futures position. If the 
term structure of futures prices is upward sloping, an investor rolls from a lower priced expiring 
contract into a higher priced next nearest futures contract. If the term structure of futures prices is 
downward sloping, an investor rolls from a higher priced expiring contract into a lower priced 
next nearest futures contract. This suggests that the term structure of futures prices drives the roll 
return. For heating oil the spot return was about 0.9% and the roll return was about 4.9%. The roll 
return was positive because the energy markets are typically, but not always, in backwardation. 
The excess return for gold futures was about -5.7% per annum, the spot price return was -0.8%   15
and the roll return was about -4.8%. The roll return was negative because the gold futures market 
is almost always in contango. The average spot return of heating oil and gold futures was close to 
zero. The 11.2% excess return difference between heating oil and gold was largely driven by a 
9.5% difference in roll returns. The 1.7% difference in spot returns was a relatively minor source 
of the overall return difference between heating oil and gold. This example illustrates that excess 




Excess and Spot Returns












































Heating Oil Futures Excess Return     
Heating Oil Spot Return     
Gold Futures Excess Return    
Gold Spot Return    
Excess Spot Roll
Return Return Return
Heating Oil 5.53% 0.93% 4.60%
Gold -5.68% -0.79% -4.90%
Difference 11.22% 1.72% 9.50%
 
 
3.4.3 Implications for asset allocation 
How important have roll returns been in explaining the cross-section of individual 
commodity futures excess returns? Figure 6 shows the historical relationship between excess 
returns and roll returns for individual commodities. Three commodities (copper, heating oil, and   16
live cattle) had, on average, positive roll returns and positive excess returns. Corn, wheat, silver, 
gold and coffee had, on average, negative roll returns and negative excess returns. The average 
excess return for the positive roll return commodities was 4.2% and the average excess return for 
the negative roll return commodities was -4.6%. The almost 9% excess return difference between 
the positive roll return portfolio and the negative roll return portfolios consists of a 7.5% 
difference in roll returns and a 1.4% difference in spot returns
xix. Roll returns explain 91% of the 
cross-sectional variation of commodity futures returns in Figure 6.  
Long-only normal backwardation suggests that commodity futures excess returns should be 
positive, for both backwardated and contangoed commodity futures. In fact, Gorton and 
Rouwenhorst (2004) suggest that under normal backwardation there should be no relationship 
between the term structure of commodity futures prices and the returns from investing in 
commodity futures. Under normal backwardation, what matters is the degree of normal 
backwardation, which, unfortunately, is unobservable ex ante. Normal backwardation suggests 
that all of the observations in Figure 6 should lie in the northeast and the northwest quadrants. 
The hedging pressure hypothesis is consistent with the observation that excess returns are 
positively correlated with roll returns and that backwardated commodity futures should have 
positive returns and contangoed commodity futures should have negative returns. Figure 6 does 
not, therefore, empirically provide any support for long only normal backwardation. Figure 6 
challenges the relevance of normal backwardation as an explanation of actual commodity futures 
returns. 
Roll returns are a major driver of the cross-section of realized commodity futures excess 
returns. Realized commodity futures returns have two components: the expected price of 
insurance and the unexpected price of insurance. Roll returns represent the expected price of 
insurance. As Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2004) note, unexpected price deviations, which represent 
the unexpected price of insurance, are unpredictable and should average out to zero over time. It 
is interesting that over a very long time period, the expected price of insurance has been the 
dominant driver of long-term commodity futures returns and that unexpected returns have played 
a secondary role. The regression intercept of 0.89% in Figure 6 seems to suggest that if the term 
structure of commodity prices was flat, that is if prices were the same for each futures maturity, 
then roll returns and excess returns would be close to zero. Further examination of the data also 
reveals that the roll return accounts for more than half of the excess return level of the GSCI 
(2.59% of the 4.49% excess return) and more than three quarters of the equally weighted twelve 
commodity average excess return.   17
Figure 6
Excess Returns and Roll Returns
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Intercept Roll Roll Adjusted 
Intercept T-Stat Coefficient T-Stat R Square
Compound Annualized Excess Return 0.89% 1.84 1.20 10.97 91.57%
Excess Spot Roll
Return Return Return
Corn -5.63% 1.57% -7.19%
Wheat -5.39% 0.57% -5.96%
Silver -8.09% -2.54% -5.55%
Coffee -6.36% -1.24% -5.12%
Gold -5.68% -0.79% -4.90%
Sugar -3.12% 0.30% -3.42%
Hogs -2.75% 0.26% -3.01%
Soybeans -0.35% 1.80% -2.15%
Cotton 0.10% -0.62% 0.72%
Copper 6.17% 3.28% 2.89%
Cattle 5.07% 1.97% 3.10%
Heating Oil 5.53% 0.93% 4.60%
Twelve Commodity Average -1.71% 0.46% -2.17%
Positive Roll Return Average 4.22% 1.39% 2.83%
Negative Roll Return Average -4.67% -0.01% -4.66%














The term structure of futures prices may reveal information about whether suppliers of 
commodity price insurance should expect a positive rate of return. If unexpected price changes 
average to zero over time, then going long a commodity futures in a backwardated market 
supplies price insurance and going short a commodity futures in a contagoed market supplies 
commodity price insurance. Similarly, going short a backwardated commodity futures, or going 
long a contangoed commodity futures, is similar to buying insurance. If there is a long-term 
return from investing in commodity futures, it will be from providing insurance, not from buying 
insurance. If positive returns only accrue to buyers of insurance ultimately there will be no 
providers of insurance.  In the context of the insurance explanation, it is not surprising that the 
term structure of futures prices is a significant driver of the cross-section of commodity futures 
returns. This insight will be important for both strategic and tactical asset allocation. 
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3.5 Time-series variation in commodity futures returns 
We now consider multifactor models of commodity futures returns. However, first we explore the 
conventional wisdom that commodity futures provide good inflation hedges. 
 
3.5.1 Inflation hedges – but what component of inflation? 
Over the 1970 to 1999 period, Greer (2000) shows that the Chase Physical Commodity Index had 
a time series correlation of 0.25 with the annual rate of inflation and a time series correlation of 
0.59 with the change in the annual rate of inflation. Strongin and Petsch (1996) find that the GSCI 
does well during periods of rising inflation (especially relative to stocks and nominal bonds). 
First, we need to explore the relation between the components of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
and the components of commodity futures indices. 
Figure 7 
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Figure 7 shows two ways of categorizing the components of the CPI. Commodities have 
about a 40% weight in the CPI and services have a 60% weight. Energy commodities make up 
only about 4% of the CPI, food commodities constitute about 14% of the CPI and other 
commodities account for the remaining commodity exposure of the CPI. It is clear that a broad-
based commodity futures index excludes many items measured in the CPI. For instance, the 
single largest component of the CPI is the owners' equivalent rent of a primary residence. It is 
possible that a commodity futures index could be a good hedge of the 40% of the CPI that 
consists of commodities, but what of the other 60%? It seems reasonable to expect that the greater 
the overlap between the composition of a commodity index and the composition of the CPI the 
higher the correlation of returns. The mismatch between the composition of a commodity futures 
index, such as the GSCI, and an inflation index, such as the CPI, limits the ability of commodity 
futures to be an effective inflation hedge.  
 
3.5.2 Expected and unexpected inflation 
Actual inflation can be decomposed into two components: expected inflation and unexpected 
inflation, the difference between actual and expected inflation. Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2004) 
point out that absent any systematic errors in the market's forecast of future spot prices, expected 
trends in spot prices should not be a source of return for futures investors. This suggests that the 
expected inflation beta of commodity futures should be zero. Assuming, for purposes of 
convenience, that year-over-year changes in the rate of inflation are unpredictable, a good proxy 
for unexpected inflation is simply the actual change in the rate of inflation
xx. Figure 8 shows that, 
historically, contemporaneous changes in the annual rate of inflation have explained 43% of 
GSCI annual excess return time series variation
xxi. That is, average GSCI excess returns have 
been positive (+24.5%) and above average (+4.9%) when year-over-year unexpected inflation 
rises, and the GSCI excess return has been negative (-8.4%) and below average when year-over-
year inflation falls.  
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Figure 8
GSCI Excess Return and Unexpected Inflation
Annual Observations, 1969 to 2003 
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GSCI S&P 500 Treasury
Geometric Average Excess Return When Inflation Rises 24.53% -3.60% -0.14%
Geometric Average Excess Return When Inflation Falls -8.36% 12.10% 4.42%
Geometric Average Excess Return  4.92% 4.88% 2.38%
 
Table 3 shows that individual commodity futures excess returns are largely uncorrelated 
with one another.   This suggests that the sensitivity to inflation varies across the commodity 
futures components. Table 4 shows the historical sensitivity of commodity returns (index, sector 
and components) to actual prior annual inflation and actual changes in the annual rate of inflation 
over the 1982-2003 period. The GSCI has a positive, but statistically insignificant, actual inflation 
beta and a positive, and significant, unexpected inflation beta. Three sectors (energy, livestock 
and industrial metals) and three individual commodity futures (heating oil, cattle and copper) 
have significant unexpected inflation betas. The precious metals sector has a statistically 
significant negative inflation beta, as do gold and silver. No other sectors or individual 
commodities have significant positive inflation betas. Though some commodities respond 
positively to changes in the rate of inflation, others have negative or insignificant inflation betas. 
Indeed, the equally weighted average of the twelve commodities has positive, but insignificant, 
inflation betas




Commodity Excess Return And Change in Annual Inflation
Annual Observations, 1982 to 2003
Intercept Inflation Inflation  Inflation  Inflation Adjusted 
Intercept T-Stat Coefficient T-S tat Coefficient T-S tat R Square
GSCI -5.27% -0.38 3.92 0.93 10.88 2.98 27.96%
Non-Energy -5.37% -0.64 1.84 0.71 3.94 1.77 5.95%
Energy -9.02% -0.36 7.50 0.97 18.80 2.81 24.54%
Livestock -11.90% -1.15 4.73 1.49 6.88 2.51 17.64%
Agriculture -7.60% -0.67 1.68 0.48 1.06 0.35 -9.64%
Industrial Metals 6.71% 0.26 1.20 0.15 17.44 2.59 26.73%
Precious Metals 20.93% 2.36 -8.02 -2.95 -2.78 -1.19 26.19%
Heating Oil -6.40% -0.26 6.07 0.81 17.76 2.73 23.89%
Cattle -7.07% -0.75 4.00 1.38 7.19 2.87 24.02%
Hog -20.39% -1.23 6.32 1.24 6.47 1.48 2.04%
Wheat -13.24% -0.87 3.09 0.67 -2.58 -0.64 -0.05%
Corn -23.02% -1.37 5.91 1.15 4.44 1.00 -2.57%
Soybeans 20.50% 1.17 -5.95 -1.11 -1.10 -0.24 -2.77%
Su gar 1.39% 0.06 -0.06 -0.01 3.56 0.61 -7.75%
Coffee 4.25% 0.11 -0.81 -0.07 0.24 0.02 -11.05%
Cotton 6.74% 0.31 -0.51 -0.08 0.30 0.05 -10.99%
Gold 19.16% 2.02 -7.50 -2.58 -2.38 -0.95 20.27%
Silver 24.83% 2.16 -10.18 -2.89 -4.45 -1.46 24.33%
Copper 7.15% 0.27 1.43 0.18 17.08 2.45 23.77%
EW Twelve Commodities 1.16% 0.14 0.15 0.06 3.88 1.74 10.30%
 
 
The wide variation in individual commodity futures unexpected inflation betas is explained 
by the roll returns. Figure 9 shows that average roll returns have been highly correlated with 
unexpected inflation betas. Average roll returns explained 67% of the cross-sectional variation of 
commodity futures unexpected inflation betas. In other words, the realized return for supplying 
commodity price insurance has been highly correlated with realized unexpected inflation betas. 
Commodities such as copper, heating oil, and live cattle had positive roll returns and high 
unexpected inflation betas. Commodities such as wheat, silver, gold and soybeans had negative 
roll returns and negative unexpected inflation betas.    22
What explains the linkage between roll returns and inflation betas? Table 2 shows some 
commodities that Till (2000, 2003) suggests are difficult to store, and it is these commodities that 
seem to have had high roll returns and positive inflation betas. Storability, then, could be the link 




Unexpected Inflation Betas and Roll Returns
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Industrial Metals 17.44 0.84%
Precious Metals -2.78 -4.64%
Heating Oil 17.76 4.20%
Live Cattle 7.19 2.85%










Twelve Commodity Average 3.88 -2.05%
Positive Roll Return Average 10.58 2.71%
Negative Roll Return Average 0.53 -4.43%
 
3.5.3 Sensitivity to other market risk factors 
Even though commodity returns seem to be largely uncorrelated with one another, perhaps they 
exhibit some common connection to other pervasive risk factors. Early research by Bailey and 
Chan (1993) empirically estimates a connection between the commodity futures basis (the spread 
between spot commodity and futures prices) and a number of factors
xxiii over the 1966 to 1987   23
period.  We consider the five-factor model of Fama and French (1993). In addition to the popular 
three factors (market excess return, a high minus low book to market return (HML) and a small 
minus large cap return (SML)), they also consider a term spread return (long-term bond excess 
return) and a default spread (corporate bond return minus government bond return). While they 
find no evidence that these last two factors are priced for stocks, they might be important for 
commodity futures. Finally, following Ferson and Harvey (1993) and Dumas and Solnik (1995), 
we consider the foreign exchange rate exposure of the commodity futures. If the return to 
investing in individual commodity futures is the return from supplying individual commodity 
price insurance, a multifactor explanation is equivalent to saying that the price of individual 
commodity price insurance is driven by various common risk factors.  
Table 5 presents the unconditional (i.e. assumed constant) monthly betas of commodity 
excess returns relative to a common set of “risk factors”. The GSCI has a statistically significant 
negative beta with regard to the change in trade weighted dollar  and no statistically significant 
betas with regard to other risk factors. The non-energy sector has a statistically significant, but 
small equity risk premium beta and energy has a statistically significant negative dollar beta. 
Reinforcing the earlier observation that commodity futures have low correlations with one 
another, there are no uniformly positive or negative sensitivities to these risk factors across 
individual commodities. Nor are there any risk factors that seem to be more important than others 
in explaining the time series variation of individual commodity futures returns.  
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Table 5
Unconditional Commodity Futures Betas
Monthly Observations, December 1982 to May 2004
  S&P 500
  Excess Term    Default  
Return Premium Premium SMB HML ∆Dollar
GSCI -0.05 -0.05   -0.25 0.07 -0.06 -0.57 **
Non-Energy 0.10 ** -0.11 -0.03 0.05 0.00 -0.05
Energy -0.14 -0.17   -0.07 0.04 -0.07 -1.05 **
Livestock 0.06 0.05 -0.23 0.05 0.04 0.09
Agriculture 0.09 -0.01 -0.12 0.06 -0.02 0.10
Industrial Metals 0.16 * -0.32 ** 1.18 *** 0.19 -0.05 -0.35
Precious Metals -0.08 -0.15 0.42 0.14 * -0.03 -0.83 **
Heating Oil -0.13 -0.22   -0.14 0.06 -0.16 -0.91 **
Cattle 0.07 0.01   -0.10   0.11 -0.01 0.21
Hogs 0.03 0.15 -0.45 -0.04 0.13 -0.08
Wheat 0.11 0.04 -0.42 0.19 * -0.12 -0.18
Corn 0.11 0.00 0.13 0.09 -0.01 0.55 *
Soybeans 0.04 -0.07 0.13 -0.02   0.08 -0.07
Sugar 0.05 -0.11   -0.43 * 0.16 -0.09 0.12
Coffee 0.13 -0.15 0.38 -0.25 * 0.16 -0.22
Cotton 0.18   -0.41 0.88 -0.08   0.03 0.46  
Gold -0.15 ** -0.12 0.39 0.12 *** -0.04 -0.91 ***
Silver 0.08   -0.52 *** 1.16 *** 0.32 ** -0.02 -0.39  
Copper 0.21 ** -0.31 * 1.15 *** 0.16 0.00 -0.42
Twelve Commodity Average 0.06 -0.14 ** 0.22 0.07 0.00 -0.15
Note: *, **, *** significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.  
3.5 The diversification return 
The diversification return provides another reason to simultaneously analyze the performance of a 
commodity index and its constituents. The diversification return can lead to significant 
differences between the compound return of a commodity index and the weighted average 
compound return of the index's constituents. For instance in Table 1, the compound return of an 
equally weighted and monthly-rebalanced portfolio of twelve commodities was 1.01%. Yet the 
average geometric return of the twelve individual commodity was -1.71%. In other words, 
rebalancing a portfolio added 2.72% per annum to the performance of the portfolio. Hence, it 
would be a mistake when measuring the performance of an equally weighted portfolio to ascribe 
the return of 2.72% to a risk premium. Booth and Fama (1992) show that rebalancing a portfolio 
to predetermined fixed weights results in a diversification return
xxiv. They showed that the stand   25
alone geometric return of an asset can be approximated as its arithmetic average return minus one 
half its variance. However, the geometric return of an asset in a portfolio can be approximated as 
its arithmetic average return minus one half its covariance with the portfolio. The diversification 
return is roughly one half the difference between an asset's variance and its covariance.   
Table 6 illustrates the mechanics of the portfolio diversification return using the historical 
annual excess returns for the GSCI Heating Oil index and the S&P 500. From 1993 to 2003, 
heating oil had a geometric annual excess return of 8.2%, the S&P 500 had a geometric annual 
excess return of 6.8%, the average of these two returns was 7.5% and the geometric excess return 
of an equally weighted annually rebalanced portfolio was 10.9%. The diversification return in this 
instance is simply the difference between 10.9% and 7.5%, or about 3.4%.  
Whether or not the 8.2% excess return of heating oil is a risk premium, it is certainly obvious 
that the 3.5% diversification return is not a risk premium.  The average of the individual variances 
was 12.8% (the average of the heating oil variance of 21.2% and the S&P 500 variance of 4.4%) 
and the average of the asset covariances with the equally weighted portfolio was 5.3% (the 
average of the heating oil covariance of 9.5% and the S&P 500 covariance of 1.1%). One half of 
the difference of these two averages is about 3.5%, the diversification return. 
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Table 6
The mechanics of the diversification return
Equally Weighted
Heating Oil S&P 500 Portfolio
Excess Return Excess Return Excess Return
1994 19.96% -2.92% 8.52%
1995 7.73% 31.82% 19.78%
1996 67.37% 17.71% 42.54%
1997 -35.06% 28.11% -3.48%
1998 -50.51% 23.51% -13.50%
1999 73.92% 16.30% 45.11%
2000 66.71% -15.06% 25.82%
2001 -36.62% -15.97% -26.30%
2002 41.40% -23.80% 8.80%
2003 21.90% 27.62% 24.76%
Weighted Average
Portfolio Weight 50% 50%
Geometric Return 8.21% 6.76% 7.49% 10.95%
Variance 21.22% 4.44% 12.83% 5.34%
Beta (EW Portfolio) 1.79 0.21 1.00 1.00
Covariance 9.54% 1.14% 5.34% 5.34%
Diversification Return  = EW Portfolio Return    -   Weighted Average Return = 10.95% - 7.49% = 3.46%
Approximate
Diversification Return  = (Average Variance         -        Average Covariance)/2 = ( 12.83% - 5.34% ) /2 = 3.74%
 
Figure 10 shows that the diversification return can vary substantially. For an equally 
weighted, monthly rebalanced portfolio of the twelve individual GSCI commodities, the 
diversification return has been 2.72% over the December 1982 to May 2004 period. The size of 
the diversification return is influenced by the average variance of a portfolio’s constituents. 
Separating the twelve individual commodities into two portfolios of above median volatility 
commodities and below median volatility commodities, shows that the above median volatility 
portfolio had a diversification return almost three times larger than the low volatility portfolio. De 
Chiara and Raab document a diversification return of 2.8% for the DJ AIG index, over the 1991 
to 2001 time period, and Greer estimates a 2.5% diversification return for the Chase Physical 
Commodities index over the 1970 to 1999 time period. An equally weighted portfolio consisting 
of the seventeen individual commodities currently in the CRB index, rebalanced monthly, had a 
diversification return of 4.24% since 1990. Additionally, the frequency of rebalancing can impact 
the size of the diversification returns. For the seventeen individual commodities currently in the 
CRB index, if the portfolio weights were only rebalanced annually, the diversification return 
would have been 2.33%.    27
It is important to distinguish between a return caused by portfolio variance reduction and a 
return that might otherwise be credited to a risk premium. For a risk premium, expected returns 
increase as risk rises. For a diversification return, returns rise while portfolio variance falls. 
Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2004) analyze the performance of an equally weighted portfolio of 
commodity futures over the time period 1959 to 2004. They find that the historical risk premium 
of this monthly rebalanced portfolio was about 5%. However, Figure 10 shows that the 
diversification return for a sample of seventeen equally weighted commodities over the time 
period 1990 to 2004 was over 4%. This raises the possibility that the risk premium they infer 
from their data is actually a diversification return. 
 
Figure 10
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4. Asset allocation with commodity futures 
Our historical analysis has revealed the following facts. First, the average return to commodity 
futures is close to zero. Second, the correlation of the index constituents is low. Third, the 
diversification return is an important contributor to the average performance. One can think of the 
diversification return as the return to a mechanical active strategy. Fourth, the term structure of 
commodity futures is a strong explanatory driver of the cross-section of returns. The setting we 
have described is one that invites active asset allocation. 
 
4.1 Strategic asset allocation 
There are two ways that investors usually think about forming portfolios: an asset only exercise 
and an asset-liability exercise. From an asset only perspective, Anson (1999) looks at the 
performance of stocks, bonds and cash collateralized commodity futures indices from 1974 to 
1997, finds that the demand for commodities rises as an investor's risk aversion rises and that an 
investor with high risk aversion should invest about 20% in commodities. Jensen, Johnson and 
Mercer (2000) examine portfolios that can invest in stocks, corporate bonds, Treasury-bills, real 
estate investment trusts and the cash collateralized GSCI over the period 1973 to 1997. They find 
that, depending upon risk tolerance, commodities should represent anywhere from 5-36% of 
investors' portfolios. Over the 1972 to 2001 period, Nijman and Swinkels (2003) address the issue 
from the standpoint of pension plans with nominal and real liabilities. They find that pension 
plans seeking to hedge nominal liabilities that already invest in long-term bonds and global equity 
are unlikely to improve risk adjusted returns through commodity investment. They find, though, 
that pension plans with liabilities indexed to inflation can significantly increase the return-risk 
trade off through commodity futures investment. For many investors commodity futures 
investment remains a curiosity. Harvard University's endowment is an example of an organization 
that has acted on its curiosity and currently has a 13% strategic asset allocation to commodities
xxv. 
Imagine an investor with a strategic asset allocation of 60% stocks and 40% bonds. This 
strategic asset allocation reflects the level of risk the hypothetical investor is willing to tolerate. 
How should this investor go about investing in commodity futures? One possibility is to make a 
cash collateralized commodity futures investment producing the total return of the GSCI index. 
Since there are a number of commodity futures vehicles using bonds as the underlying collateral, 
bond collateralized commodity futures are another investment possibility. Recognizing that   29
collateralized commodity futures are overlaid on another asset, yet another possibility would be to 
invest in an equity collateralized commodity futures vehicle.  
Figure 11 illustrates the historical return and risk of five possible investments: bonds, stocks, 
cash collateralized commodity futures, bond collateralized commodity futures and stock 
collateralized commodity futures. Figure 11 also makes clear that no matter which collateral is 
used, a standalone long-only  GSCI commodity futures investment has volatility most comparable 
to stocks. Efficient frontier 1 represents optimal mixes of stocks and bonds. Efficient frontier 2 
traces out optimal mixes of the five assets: bonds, stocks, cash collateralized commodity futures, 
bond collateralized commodity futures and equity collateralized commodity futures. Think of this 
as having the opportunity to invest in a combination of five different mutual funds where the 
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S&P 500 0% 0.37 -0.26
Intermediate Bond 59% 0.41 0.26
Cash Collateralized Commodity Future 0% 0.39 0.41
Bond Collateralized Commodity Futures 7% 0.50 0.47
S&P 500 Collateralized Commodity Futures 34% 0.55 0.35
"Optimal" Portfolio 0.64 0.47
60% Stocks/40% Bonds 0.44
 
 
Historically, for the risk level of the 60/40 stock-bond portfolio, adding commodity futures 
enhanced return by about 2% (from roughly 10% to 12%). This volatility matching portfolio   30
consists of a 59% allocation to bonds, a 7% allocation to bond collateralized commodity futures 
and a 34% allocation to stock collateralized commodity futures. The portfolio Sharpe ratio rises 
to 0.64 from the 0.44 Sharpe ratio of the 60% stock and 40% bond portfolio.
xxvi Equity 
collateralized commodity futures have a higher Sharpe ratio and information ratio than equities 
and this drives the allocation shift from stocks into equity collateralized commodity futures. The 
portfolio constraint requiring that volatility equal the volatility of a 60% stock and 40% bond 
portfolio drives the increased bond allocation. The message of this exercise is that commodity 
futures should be thought of as an asset allocation overlay, and that there is no natural underlying 
asset to attach the overlay returns to. The strategic rationale for commodity futures exposure is to 
optimally combine commodity futures with other portfolio assets in order to achieve the highest 
possible portfolio Sharpe ratio. Long-only commodity futures can be useful portfolio diversifiers 
as long as they provide a positive source of uncorrelated return (alpha).  This conclusion holds for 
both an asset-only framework and an asset-liability framework.   
Is exposure to a long-only commodity futures index such as the GSCI the best way to 
improve a portfolio’s Sharpe ratio with commodity futures? Treynor and Black (1973) showed 
that an asset’s information ratio is a guide to the potential improvement in a portfolio’s Sharpe 
ratio. Table 7 shows that, from December 1982 to May 2004, the long-only GSCI had an 
information ratio of about 0.36 relative to stocks, bonds and a balanced portfolio consisting of 
60% stocks and 40% bonds. Energy has the highest information ratio relative to stocks and the 
balanced portfolio. Industrial metals and energy have the highest information ratios relative to 
bonds. However, the highest information ratio portfolio is formed by going long assets with 
positive information ratios and going short assets with negative information ratios. “Optimal” 
long-short commodity futures portfolios had information ratios of 0.75 relative to stocks, 0.86 
relative to bonds and 0.75 relative to the balanced portfolio. The fact that these long-short 
commodity futures portfolios have information ratios twice as high as the long-only GSCI is 
consistent with the work of Grinold and Kahn (2000) and Clarke, de Silva and Thorley (2002) on 
the portfolio efficiency gains of long-short investing. 
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Table 7
Marginal Contribution To Portfolio Sharpe Ratio
Monthly Observations, December 1982 to May 2004
Stock Bond 60/40
Residual Information Residual Information Residual Information
Alpha Risk Ratio Alpha Risk Ratio Alpha Risk Ratio
GSCI 6.19% 16.99% 0.36 6.04% 17.00% 0.36 6.30% 16.99% 0.37
Non-Energy -0.49% 9.77% -0.05 0.60% 9.88% 0.06 -0.56% 9.79% -0.06
Energy 12.67% 31.22% 0.41 12.21% 31.28% 0.39 12.99% 31.21% 0.42
Livestock 2.93% 14.50% 0.20 3.10% 14.52% 0.21 2.77% 14.50% 0.19
Agriculture -2.87% 14.32% -0.20 -1.68% 14.36% -0.12 -2.89% 14.34% -0.20
Industrial Metals 5.08% 22.74% 0.22 8.70% 22.60% 0.39 5.35% 22.81% 0.23
Precious Metals -3.77% 14.86% -0.25 -3.87% 14.88% -0.26 -3.54% 14.84% -0.24
Heating Oil 11.64% 32.54% 0.36 11.70% 32.56% 0.36 12.06% 32.53% 0.37
Live Cattle 5.32% 13.96% 0.38 5.98% 14.01% 0.43 5.23% 13.97% 0.37
Live Hogs -0.05% 24.25% 0.00 -1.22% 24.16% -0.05 -0.36% 24.24% -0.01
Wheat -4.20% 21.03% -0.20 -3.72% 21.08% -0.18 -4.42% 21.02% -0.21
Corn -4.21% 22.63% -0.19 -2.61% 22.66% -0.12 -4.19% 22.65% -0.19
Soybeans 1.60% 21.53% 0.07 2.99% 21.47% 0.14 1.78% 21.53% 0.08
Sugar 3.25% 38.72% 0.08 4.97% 38.68% 0.13 3.45% 38.73% 0.09
Coffee -0.69% 39.67% -0.02 4.91% 39.28% 0.12 -0.08% 39.75% 0.00
Cotton 1.46% 22.59% 0.06 3.88% 22.59% 0.17 1.55% 22.62% 0.07
Gold -3.57% 14.21% -0.25 -4.48% 14.38% -0.31 -3.32% 14.21% -0.23
Silver -5.97% 25.05% -0.24 -2.71% 24.77% -0.11 -5.54% 25.08% -0.22
Copper 7.35% 25.53% 0.29 11.25% 25.54% 0.44 7.52% 25.62% 0.29
"Optimal" 0.75 0.86 0.75
 
 
In our sample, the long-only GSCI had a historical excess return of about 6% per annum. 
But Figure 12 shows that the rolling one-year GSCI excess and roll returns exhibit a declining 
return trend over time. While this trend do not tells us whether returns will be higher or lower in 
the future, however, it does raise some doubts as to whether commodity futures investment will 
average 6% in the future. The reason is simple. Though the term structure of commodity prices 
may be an important long-run driver of realized commodity futures returns, there is no way to 
determine what the term structure of futures prices will look like in the future. For instance, 
energy futures are often, though not always, backwardated, but it is not obvious what the degree 
of future backwardation will be or even that these markets remain backwardated. Gold futures are 
seemingly always in contango. Will the future return from going long gold futures continue to be 
as negative as it has been in the past?  
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Figure 12
One-Year Moving Average GSCI Excess and Roll Returns
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Another way of thinking about the value of historical returns as an indicator of future returns 
is to look at return persistence over long periods of time. Figure 13 looks at the excess return 
persistence of the GSCI, GSCI sectors and individual commodity futures from December 1982 to 
September 1993 and from October 1993 to May 2004. The correlation between first period and 
second period returns is 0.03.  The positive first period return-positive second return quadrant is 
populated by the energy and industrial metals sectors, and these two sectors drive the positive 
returns of the GSCI during both time periods. Each of the return quadrants has approximately the 
same number of observations. There seems to be little evidence of long-term return persistence 
across commodity futures.    33
Figure 13
Long-Term Excess Return Persistence
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Industrial Metals 5.99% 2.04%
Precious Metals -9.05% -1.61%
Heating Oil 4.55% 6.53%
Live Cattle 11.00% -0.59%
































Even though commodity futures provide price insurance, it is reasonable that the price of 
commodity price insurance will dynamically fluctuate over time in response to the supply of and 
demand for insurance. If too much capital is supplied for a finite insurance need, it makes sense 
that returns should decline. Obviously, a shortage of capital should increase returns. If investors 
respond to research identifying the ability of commodity futures investment to raise portfolio 
Sharpe ratios, the supply of capital increases. It is certainly possible that the trend decline in the 
excess and roll return exhibited in Figure 12 is a reflection of too much capital chasing too few 
opportunities. Extrapolating past long-term term structure returns into the future might be 
convenient, but it is no more revealing than asserting that future stock returns will be high 
because past long-term stock returns have been high. Ultimately, a long-term strategic asset 
allocation to long-only commodity futures makes sense for investors with a subjective view that 
future excess returns will be high enough to increase a portfolio’s Sharpe ratio.  Without a 
defensible expectation for the excess return of a long only commodity futures investment it is 
hard to argue for a strategic allocation to long only commodity futures.    34
4.2 Tactical asset allocation for commodity indices 
Though it may be challenging empirically to justify a long-run long-only strategic asset 
allocation to commodity futures, the possibility of short-run return predictability across time 
might make tactical allocation into commodity futures appealing and return predictability across 
commodity futures might make active allocation among individual commodity futures 
attractive.
xxvii Cochrane (1999) refers to findings of stock, bond and foreign exchange return 
predictability as “new facts in finance”, and there is no reason why predictability should not 
extend to commodity futures returns. Predictability enhances the appeal of a commodity futures 
overlay strategy, since, as Litterman (2004) points out, overlay strategies are the most capital 
efficient way to produce alpha. 
Previous research has suggested a tactical role for commodity futures. Jensen, Johnson and 
Mercer (2000, 2002) found that the GSCI commodity index outperformed stocks and bonds when 
their (now discontinued) measure of Federal Reserve monetary policy rose. Strongin and Petsch 
(1996) found that GSCI commodity index returns were tied to current economic conditions and, 
when inflation rose, had above average returns and performed well relative to stocks and bonds. 
Nijman and Swinkels (2003) find that nominal and real portfolio efficient frontiers can be 
improved by timing allocation to the GSCI commodity index in response to variation in a number 
of macroeconomic variables (bond yield, the rate of inflation, the term spread and the default 
spread). Vrugt, Bauer, Molenaar and Steenkamp (2004) find that GSCI commodity index return 
variation is affected by measures of the business cycle, the monetary environment and market 
sentiment. These analyses suggest that commodity futures returns respond systematically to 
changes in state variables. Yet the low cross-correlation of commodity returns with one another 
and the message of Tables 4, 5 and 6 suggest that these systematic influences have at best a weak 
ability to explain the time series variation of commodity excess returns.  
One alternative might be to consider a short-term momentum based strategy. The economic 
interpretation is as follows. We expect a positive average return for commodities that provide 
insurance. The “insurance providing” role is probably persistent in the short-term. Hence, a 
momentum based strategy says: ‘if the commodity has provided insurance in the past period, it is 
likely to provide insurance in the next period.  
While there is a considerable literature on momentum in equity markets (e.g. Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993), Carhart (1997), Conrad and Kaul (1998)), there is no simple explanation as to 
why momentum works. Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) suggest that momentum is a   35
behavioral artifact due to investor underreaction to news. Johnson (2004) argues that momentum 
returns are just payoffs for taking risk. However, for commodity futures, momentum could be a 
simple result of the short-term persistence of the realized pay-off to providing  insurance. 
A momentum strategy typically goes long an asset after prior returns have been positive and 
goes short an asset after prior returns have been negative. Figure 14 shows the pay-off to a 
strategy of going long the GSCI for one month if the previous one year excess return has been 
positive or going long the GSCI if the previous one year excess return has been negative. This 
result is stable over time. While the momentum effect is strongest in the first 13 years of the 
sample, the effect is robust in the more recent period. 
Figure 14
GSCI Momentum Returns
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We also consider some portfolio strategies.  One commodity futures momentum strategy 
might be to invest in either cash collateralized commodity futures or cash, depending upon which 
strategy had the highest prior return for some time period. Alternatively, the strategy could be to 
invest in equity collateralized commodity futures or stocks, or bond collateralized commodity 
futures or bonds.    36
Table 8 illustrates the pay-off to an investment strategy that invests 100% of portfolio assets 
in one of four strategies: cash, bonds, cash collateralized commodity futures or bond 
collateralized commodity futures. The decision rule is to invest in the strategy that has the highest 
previous twelve month return. During this time period, bond collateralized commodity futures 
outperformed cash collateralized commodity futures by over 2.3% per annum. In turn, the 
momentum portfolio outperformed bond collateralized commodity futures by over 2.9% per 
annum. In this case, tactical allocation raises portfolio efficiency as reflected by the momentum 
portfolio’s Sharpe ratio of 0.70. 
There is no reason to limit the momentum exercise to just commodity futures, bonds and 
cash. Table 8 shows that historically equity collateralized commodity futures outperformed bond 
and cash collateralized commodity futures. The simple momentum portfolio had a return of 
20.5% per annum, over 3% higher than the commodity futures, bond and cash momentum 
portfolio. The Sharpe ratio of this strategy is 0.72. 
Compound Annualized Compound Annualized
Annualized Standard Sharpe Annualized Standard Sharpe
Return Deviation Ratio Return Deviation  Ratio
Momentum Portfolio 17.32% 16.01% 0.70 20.55% 20.04% 0.72
    Asset class returns
    Cash + GSCI 12.16% 18.55% 0.32 12.16% 18.55% 0.32
    Bond + GSCI 14.43% 19.19% 0.43 14.43% 19.19% 0.43
    Stocks + GSCI 17.74% 23.83% 0.48
    Cash 6.19% 0.83% 0.00 6.19% 0.83% 0.00
    Bond 8.31% 5.81% 0.36 8.31% 5.81% 0.36
    S&P 500 11.42% 15.51% 0.34
Trading strategy is to invest in the asset class with the highest previous 12-month return. In panel A, we consider
Cash collateralized GSCI, bond collateralized GSCI, bonds, and cash. In panel B, we add stock collateralized 
GSCI and stocks.
A. Cash, Bonds, GSCI B. Cash, bonds, stocks, GSCI
Table 8
Momentum strategies based on: GSCI, bonds, cash, and equity
December 1969- May 2004
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4.3 Active allocation of the constituents of a commodity index 
Many momentum strategy analyses look at the value-added of the strategy within an asset class, 
such as going long the best performing stocks and going short the worst performing stocks. 
Figure 15 examines the pay-off to investing in an equally-weighted portfolio of the four 
commodity futures with the highest prior twelve month returns, a portfolio of the worst 
performing commodity futures, and a long/short portfolio fashioned from these two portfolios. 
Consistent with many prior momentum studies, the winner portfolio has a high excess return 
(7.0%), the loser portfolio has low excess returns (-3.4%) and the long/short portfolio achieves 
higher excess returns (10.8%) and an even higher Sharpe (0.55) ratio than either the winner or the 
loser portfolios. The long/short portfolio Sharpe ratio is more than twice as high as the Sharpe 
ratio of the long-only GSCI. 
Figure 15
Individual Commodity Momentum Portfolios










































Worst Four Commodities Equally Weighted Average
Best Four Commodities Long/Short    
Compound Annualized
Annualized Standard Sharpe
Excess Return Deviation  Ratio
Worst Four -3.42% 16.00% -0.21
Equally Weighted Average 0.80% 9.97% 0.08
Best Four 7.02% 15.77% 0.45
Long/Short 10.81% 19.63% 0.55
GSCI 4.39% 17.27% 0.25
Trading strategy sorts each month the 12 categories of GSCI based on previous 12-month return. We then track the four 
GSCI components with the highest (‘best four’) and lowest (‘worst four’) previous returns. The portfolios are rebalanced 
monthly.
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The tactical strategy in Figure 15 is a pure momentum strategy. We now consider a variation 
of the strategy that uses the sign of the previous 12-month’s return. We create an “insurance 
providing” proxy portfolio by buying commodities that have had a positive return over the past 
12 months and selling those that have had a negative return. We use the insurance term because 
going long a backwardated commodity provides price insurance as does going short a contangoed 
commodity. It is possible that in a particular month that all past returns are positive or negative.  
Figure 16 shows that an “insurance providing” portfolio had an excess return of 6.5% and a 
Sharpe ratio of 0.85. Note the pure “insurance providing” portfolio had higher returns and a 
higher Sharpe ratio than the long-only GSCI. Conceptually this makes sense. The GSCI is a long 
only portfolio that is a mix of “insurance providing” and “insurance buying” portfolio positions. 
A long only commodity futures index ends up providing insurance for backwardated commodity 
futures, a potential source of positive return, and buying insurance for contangoed commodity 
futures, a potential source of negative return. 
Figure 16
Individual Commodity Momentum Portfolio Based on the Sign of the Previous Return













































"Providing Insurance" Equally Weighted Average GSCI
Compound Annualized
Annualized Standard Sharpe
Excess Return  Deviation  Ratio
Providing Insurance 6.54% 7.65% 0.85
Equally Weighted Portfolio 0.80% 9.97% 0.08
GSCI 4.39% 17.27% 0.25
Trading strategy is an equally weighted portfolio of twelve components of the GSCI. The portfolio is rebalanced monthly. 
The ‘Providing Insurance’ portfolio goes long those components that have had positive returns over the previous 12 months 
and short those components that had negative returns over the previous period.
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4.4 Tactical asset allocation using the term structure of futures prices 
We now consider an investable strategy that considers the term structures of futures prices as a 
tactical input for a trading strategy. We examine the overall GSCI as well as the components of 
the GSCI.  
 
4.4.1 Term Structure and GSCI Tactical Asset Allocation 
When the price of the nearby GSCI futures contract is greater than the price of the next nearby 
futures contract (when the GSCI is backwardated), we expect that the long only excess return 
should, on average, be positive. Nash (2003) finds that GSCI total returns are positive when the 
GSCI is backwardated. Furthermore, when the price of the nearby GSCI futures contract is less 
than the price of the next nearby futures contract (when the GSCI is in contango), we expect that 
the long only excess return should, on average, be negative. Since inception of GSCI futures 
trading, the GSCI has been backwardated as often as it has been in contango. The annualized 
payoff from buying the GSCI
xxviii when the term structure is backwardated is 11.2%. However, 
when the term structure is contagoed, the annualized excess return is -5.0%. The payoffs are 
illustrated in Table 9. A strategy going long the GSCI when backwardated and short when 
contangoed, and therefore always having an exposure to the GSCI, generates an excess return of 
8.2% per annum compared to the average long-only excess return of 2.6% and a much higher 
Sharpe ratio. The term structure seems to be an effective tactical indicator. The economic 
interpretation is that today’s commodity term structure gives an indication of the future price for 





GSCI Backwardated 11.25% 18.71% 0.60
GSCI Contangoed -5.01% 17.57% -0.29
Long if Backwardated, Short if Contangoed 8.18% 18.12% 0.45
Cash Collateralized GSCI 2.68% 18.23% 0.15
Table 9
Using the Information in the GSCI Term Structure for a Tactical Strategy
July 1992 to May 2004 
   40
4.4.2 Active Allocation of  GSCI components 
Exhibit 17 shows the results of a trading strategy based on the term structure of 
individual commodity futures.
xxix  Two portfolios are created: a long portfolio consisting 
of the six commodities with the highest ratio of nearby futures price to next nearby 
futures price, and a short portfolio consisting of the six commodities with the lowest ratio 
of nearby futures price to next nearby futures price. The Sharpe ratio of this long/short 
portfolio was 0.47, almost twice as high as the Sharpe ratio of the long-only GSCI and 
over four times higher than the equally weighted portfolio of twelve individual 
commodity futures. The term structure of commodity prices seems to be a valuable tool 
for allocation across individual commodity futures. 
Figure 17
Individual Commodity Term Structure Portfolio
































"Long/Short" Equally Weighted Average GSCI
Compound Annualized
Annualized Standard Sharpe
Excess Return  Deviation  Ratio
Long/Short 3.65% 7.79% 0.47
Equally Weighted Portfolio 1.01% 10.05% 0.10
GSCI 4.49% 16.97% 0.26
Trading strategy is an equally weighted portfolio of twelve components of the GSCI. The portfolio is rebalanced monthly. 
The ‘Long/Short’ portfolio goes long those six components that each month have the highest ratio of nearby future price to 
next nearby futures price, and the short portfolio goes short those six components that each month have the lowest ratio of 
nearby futures price to next nearby futures price.
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5. Conclusions 
Historically, a long-only investment in cash collateralized commodity futures has produced 
impressive average returns – somewhat like equity returns. Our paper analyzes the case for a long 
only commodity futures position in asset allocation. Central to the case for long-only commodity 
futures investment is a belief in normal backwardation. Normal backwardation suggests that all 
long positions in commodity futures should provide a positive excess return, i.e. there is a risk 
premium. Historical experience casts doubts on this belief.  
The term structure of commodity prices provides valuable information about how investors 
should allocate capital to commodity futures. Going long backwardated commodity futures and 
short contangoed commodity futures seems more likely to provide positive excess returns than 
going long both backwardated and contangoed commodity futures.  
Understanding what drives commodity futures returns provides a subjective framework with 
which to assess the prospective long-run pay-off from commodity futures investment. Roll 
returns should vary over time as the supply of and demand for commodity futures “price 
insurance” capital varies. The diversification return should vary as commodity futures volatilities 
and correlations change over time. It is an open question as to whether historical roll returns and 
diversification returns are a guide to the future. 
We analyze both the time-series and cross-sectional properties of individual commodity 
futures. We find that the conventional wisdom that commodities are a good inflation hedge 
garners only modest support in the data. We also analyze commodity futures within the context of 
a multifactor risk model.  
Our analysis of tactical asset allocation suggests three results. First, we show that adding a 
collateralized commodity futures index to a momentum strategy across asset classes improves the 
risk-reward profile. Second, using two active strategies, we provide evidence that momentum 
applied to the 12 components of the GSCI leads to a portfolio return that dominates the overall 
GSCI. Third, we show that the term structure of commodity prices provides a valuable signal for 
tactical allocation at the aggregate GSCI level as well as active allocation among the components. 
Overall, it is our sense that the strategic case for long only commodity futures depends upon 
subjective beliefs about the long-term return potential of select commodity futures and the 
appropriate portfolio weighting scheme to apply to these commodity futures. Our results suggest 
that the traditional rationales for passively including these assets as a long-only holding in a   42
diversified portfolio are suspect. Focusing on the role that commodity futures play in providing 
commodity price insurance, our research suggests that commodity futures are an important 
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Notes 
i During this time period, the correlation of returns between the S&P 500 and the GSCI was -0.03. This low correlation drives the lower 




2 + 2*0.5*0.5 * 0.1564* 0.1835 
)
1/2  which equals 0.1180. 
ii Keynes (1925) stated “it is dangerous…to apply to the future inductive arguments based on past experience, unless one can distinguish 
the broad reasons why past experience was what it was.” Carol Loomis, "Warren Buffett on the Stock Market", Fortune, December 10, 
2001, volume 144, issue 12, pages 80-87. 
iii Fama and French (1993) present evidence that stock and bond returns vary over time in response to changing levels for five risk factors: 
the term premium, the default premium, an equity market book-to-price measure, a measure of equity market capitalization and the 
equity risk premium.  
iv Traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
v Traded on the Chicago Board of Trade 
vi Traded on the New York Board of Trade 
vii Figure 2 starts in January 1991 because that is the inception date for the Dow Jones-AIG Commodity index. 
viii See www.gs.com/gsci/ for a brief explanation of the GSCI's portfolio weighting scheme. 
ix See djindexes.com/html/aig/aigabout.html for a brief explanation of the Dow Jones-AIG Commodity index weighting scheme. 
x See www.crbtrader.com/crbindex/futures_current.asp for a description of the CRB commodity index. 
xi Crude oil futures were added to the GSCI in 1987, Brent crude oil in 1999, unleaded gasoline in 1988, gasoil in 1999 and natural gas in 
1994. 









E(Rj) = the expected (average) return on asset j, 
E(Rp) = the expected (average) return on portfolio p, 
ln[1+E(Rp)] = the average return on p, expressed as a continuously compounded return, 
bjp = the covariance of asset j with portfolio p, and 
sp
2 = the variance of the simple returns on j and p. 
 






i - Σπiπjσi,j 
         
 i,j 
where 
  π = weight given to asset i (Σπ = 1.00), 
  σ
2 = variance of asset i, and 
  σi,j = covariance of  i and j. 
This is also similar to the Sharpe and Tint (1990) liability hedging concept where they find that the risk-adjusted return for a security is 
Expected return - risk penalty + liability hedging credit = Expected return - (variance - covariance )/2.  
xiii Some have argued that only a select number of commodities should have a risk premium. Kaldor (1939) introduced the concept of the 
convenience yield as a way to explain normal backwardation. The convenience yield is a function of inventory and it reflects the 
market's expectation about the future availability of a commodity. Generally, the lower the level of inventory the higher the 
convenience yield, and the higher the level of inventory the lower the convenience yield. A commodity perceived to have abundant 
inventory would have a convenience yield of zero. A convenience yield might be a risk premium. However, since not all commodities 
face the same inventory situation at all times, not all commodities should have the same risk premium.  Till (2000) suggested that 
crude oil, gasoline, live cattle, soymeal and copper are commodities that are difficult to store. Assuming that commodities that are 
difficult to store are those with relatively low inventories, Table 2 shows that difficult to store commodities have on average had high 
historical excess returns. The presence of a convenience yield is usually indicated by a futures price that is lower than the spot price 
for a commodity. However, a convenience yield is only a risk premium when the futures price is lower than the expected future spot 
price. Unfortunately, while the current spot price is always observable the expected future spot price is never observable.  
        If the convenience yield is viewed as an inventory insurance premium, there is some appeal to this approach. It is possible to view a 
crude oil future as supplying crude oil inventory insurance and a live cattle future as supplying live cattle inventory insurance.   45
                                                                                                                                                 
Because these are separate lines of business, the risk of each line of business should determine the price of insurance for each line of 
business 
xiv Bessembinder obtained data on net hedging from the Commodity Futures Trading Commission's “Commitments of Traders in 
Commodity Futures” report. This data can be found at: www.cftc.gov/cftc/cftccotreports.htm. 
xv Gold futures prices have been interpolated for the months of September 2004, November 2004, January 2005 and March 2005. 
xvi There are two components of market backwardation: the market consensus expected future spot price and a possible risk premium. 
While it is possible to observe market backwardation, it is impossible to observe normal backwardation because neither the expected 
future spot price nor the possible risk premium are observable. 
xvii In fixed income, an upward sloping yield curve produces a return attributable to the passage of time known as rolling down the yield 
curve. 
xviii The roll return is the difference between a commodity future’s spot return and excess return, and the term structure of commodity 
futures prices is the driver of the roll return. If futures prices are the same as spot prices, that is the term structure of futures prices is 
completely flat, then excess and spot returns should be the same. If futures prices are higher than spot prices, then excess returns 
should be lower than spot returns. If futures prices are below spot prices, then excess returns should be above spot returns. 
xix The GSCI had an excess return of 4.5% driven by a significant exposure to the mostly backwardated energy sector. 
xx In fact from 1969 to 2003 the first order autocorrelation of the annual rate of change of the CPI inflation rate was 0.13. 
xxi This is an univariate regression of excess return on the year-over-year change in the rate of inflation 
xxii Using overlapping data (and correcting for the induced autocorrelation) did not change the overall results of the regression analysis.  
xxiii They studied twenty-two commodities, with various start dates, over the time period 1966 to 1987. 
xxiv See endnote ix. 
xxv This position includes exposure to timberland. Details can be found at http://vpf-
web.harvard.edu/annualfinancial/pdfs/2003discussion.pdf 
xxvi The commodity futures information ratio drives the increase in the portfolio Sharpe ratio. The original portfolio Sharpe ratio is .44 and 
with the addition of the commodity futures investment this becomes ( .44
2 + .47
2 )
1/2 = .64  
xxvii An investor's strategic asset allocation is driven by static expectations about average future returns. However, there are few investors 
whose expectations for future returns do not change over time The nineteenth century German tactician Moltke is purported to have 
said “no battle plan survives its first contact with the enemy”. In a similar vein, it is possible to say that no strategic asset allocation 
plan ever survives its first contact with reality. 
xxviii Since the inception of actual trading of the GSCI futures in 1992. 
xxix Till and Eagleeye (2003) quotes Nash and Smyk (2003) in which they find that the term structure of commodity prices is a predictor of 
total returns.  